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Abstract
Universal banks can have control over borrowers by holding equity stakes in the
borrower ￿rm. Banks￿corporate control is likely to increase the likelihood of providing
a future loan as they mitigate information asymmetry and agency costs of debt. Using
panel data on Portuguese companies, we ￿nd that a bank corporate control enhances
the probability of providing a future loan by 10 percentage points relative to a relation-
ship lender with no control. This ￿nding is robust to the inclusion of many ￿rm-level
controls, including ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects, and to instrumental variable methods to correct
for the potential endogeneity of banks￿equity stakes in borrower ￿rms. Consistent
with our hypotheses, the e⁄ect is signi￿cantly higher for borrowers with greater infor-
mation asymmetry, while the e⁄ect is lower when the borrower has multiple lending
relationships or multiple banks as shareholders. Our results suggest banks￿corporate
control a⁄ect the choice of the lender in the corporate loan market.
JEL codes: G21, G34.
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11 Introduction
Bank loans are the most common source of external ￿nance for corporations worldwide.
Banks have advantages in accessing and producing information on the companies they lend to
by exploiting economies of scale and scope and by developing close relationships with ￿rms.1
Multiple loan transactions and delivery of other ￿nancial services imply that proprietary
information can be accumulated in the bank-￿rm relation. Existing theory and evidence
supports that ￿relationship banking￿can generate signi￿cant bene￿ts for the lender.
Bank-￿rm relationships extend beyond just repeated lending interactions. Universal
banks act as lenders, but they also underwrite and trade securities, hold equity stakes in
corporations, and manage mutual funds. Thus, banks can play a prominent role in the
governance of corporations as (large) shareholders. A signi￿cant number of ￿rms worldwide
have concentrated equity holders like families, non-￿nancial ￿rms, and banks (La Porta,
Lopes-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)).2 Additionally, a growing channel of bank in￿ uence
over ￿rm governance is through institutional holdings. Many universal banking groups have
developed large asset management arms in recent years, such as bank trust services, mutual
funds, and pension funds. These mutual funds can and do invest in the same publicly listed
￿rms to which banks make loans and in which they have equity stakes. Universal banks
can also have equity stakes in non-￿nancial ￿rms through theirs private equity and venture
capital divisions.
Banks￿stakes on non-￿nancial ￿rms can provide them access to information on the ￿rm￿ s
￿nancial health. For example, in some countries, like Germany, bank are represented on
￿rms￿board of directors that stem either from proxy voting (as banks hold votes of unreg-
istered bearer shares of their depositors) or from an equity stake. Whenever a banker sits
on a board, it will gain access to additional information that can provide some control over
a borrower. This may a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s access to the credit market if the insider bank is a
potential lender.
We examine the e⁄ects of banks￿involvement in corporate governance as shareholders on
￿rms￿access to the loan market. We test the hypothesis that an insider bank can be a more
1See Boot (2000) for a survey of this literature.
2Bank stakes are rare in the U.S., given the historical restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act on bank
ownership of non-￿nancial ￿rms. Several other countries allow banks to take equity stakes in non-￿nancial
corporations (see Santos (1998) for a survey).
2e⁄ective monitor and mitigate ￿nancial constraints. When a bank is both a shareholder and
a creditor, it may be better able to monitor borrower actions, and reduce the chances of
premature liquidation. A bank holding a mixed debt-equity claim can also potentially miti-
gate the problems of asset substitution and under- or over-investment (Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and Myers (1977)). Additionally, the bank-￿rm link may improve information ￿ ow
between the bank and the ￿rm. The borrower may be inclined to reveal more informa-
tion to the bank, and the bank itself has greater incentives to produce information (Boot
(2000)). With this additional information, banks may be better able to screen loans and
obtain private information on the ￿nancial status of the borrower ￿rm. If banks share these
information rents with ￿rms, we expect to see more lending when a bank plays a role in the
governance of a ￿rm.3
A testable implication therefore is that a an insider bank is more likely to capture the
future lending business of its borrower. We formalize this implication in our ￿rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): An equity stake in a borrower increases the probability that a lender
attracts future lending business from that borrower.
Borrowers that face most severe information asymmetries (e.g., small ￿rms with less
established repayment histories) have the most to bene￿t from the monitoring services that
banks provide. Thus, these models predict that informationally opaque borrowers would
use relationship loans (i.e., loans from its insider bank) more frequently than borrowers for
whom a substantial amount of information is available publicly. We capture this idea in our
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The more informationally opaque a borrower, the greater the likelihood
it will borrow from its insider bank.
The strength of the relationship with the insider bank is also likely to a⁄ect the choice of
future lenders. Indeed, ￿rms with the strongest relationship with the insider bank may not
have many ￿nancing alternatives available due to an adverse selection problem and therefore
would use loans from its insider bank more frequently. We capture this idea in our ￿nal
hypothesis:
3A bank￿ s special position as an insider may also allow it to extract rents from its information monopoly
and potentially to ￿hold-up￿a ￿rm due to information asymmetries between other lenders and the borrower
(Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)).
3Hypothesis 3 (H3): The stronger the strength of the relationship between the borrower
and the insider bank, the greater the likelihood it will borrow from its insider bank.
We use a sample of loans to private and publicly listed non-￿nancial portuguese ￿rms
over 2001-2007 to study the e⁄ect of corporate control relationships between banks and ￿rms
in the access of ￿rms to the credit market. Our sample is dominated by private ￿rms and
small loans where information asymmetry and agency costs of debt are likely to be high. The
issue of credit availability to smaller ￿rms has drawn wide attention as these ￿rms are said
to be crucial for the development of many economies. To test our hypotheses, we pair each
￿rm with each of the top 20 banks (in terms of loans activity) and estimate a logit model
of the lender choice. The results indicate that ￿rms tend to get more loans from banks
that have equity stakes in ￿rm than from banks with no such stakes. Banks with a control
stake in the ￿rm are roughly 10 percentage points more likely to be picked as future lenders
than banks with no such stake (the probability increases from 14.2% to 24.9%). We ￿nd
consistent results when we use an OLS model where the dependent variable is the weight of
a given bank in the total amount of loans of a borrower in alternative to the logit model.
We then test hypothesis 2. We use ￿rm size as our main proxy of information asymmetry.
It is reasonable to argue that smaller-sized ￿rms are less likely to be followed by investors.
Stein (2002) argues that small-business lending relies mainly on soft information. This
characterization suggests that smaller borrowers should ￿nd strong relationships (lending
and governance) with banks particularly useful and bene￿cial. Smaller ￿rms are also likely
to be relatively more informationally opaque. Thus, small ￿rms o⁄er the most potential
for proprietary information generation by a relationship lender and an insider bank. To the
extent that relationships do mitigate the information problems that smaller ￿rms face, we
should expect to ￿nd a strong negative association between the size of a borrower and its use
of an insider bank for future loans. We ￿nd that small ￿rms are more likely to borrow from
their insider bank, which is consistent with hypothesis 2. We also consider other proxies of
information asymmetry such as asset tangibility and access to public debt markets. However,
we do not ￿nd that asset tangibility and access to public debt markets have a statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect on the probability of an insider bank providing a future loan.
Finally, we test hypothesis 3. We use the number of lending relationships and the num-
ber of shareholders as proxies for the strength of the relationship with an insider bank.
4Ongena and Smith (2000) show that multiple bank relationships indeed reduce the infor-
mation monopoly by the relationship bank, but worsen the availability of credit as multiple
relationships can reduce the value of information acquisition to any individual bank. A ￿rm
with a higher number of lending relationships is less likely to use the insider bank to obtain
loans as it has other alternatives to raise external funds. Similarly, a ￿rm with multiple
banks as shareholders is not as much dependent on a single bank to raise ￿nancing. We
￿nd that both the borrower￿ s number of lending relationships and bank shareholders reduce
the probability that an insider bank provides a future loan. This ￿nding is consistent with
hypothesis 3.
An important concern with our ￿ndings is that a bank￿ s presence as a equity holder arises
endogenously in response to governance issues (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)).
Indeed, a bank could become an insider in ￿rms that have di¢ cult to access to credit markets
and have higher borrowing costs to start with. We address this concern in several ways. As a
￿rst way to address this concern we measure bank equity stakes with a one-year lag relative
to the lender choice. The results are also consistent if we measure bank equity stakes using
a three-year lag.
We also show that the positive e⁄ect of a bank insider stake on the lender choice remains
strong after controlling for a long list of possible covariates. Our ￿ndings are not explained
by bank reputation, past lending relationships and a variety of ￿rm characteristics such as
￿rm size and complexity, performance, ownership structure, and leverage, among others.
Moreover, the results are robust to the inclusion of ￿rm (and bank) ￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿rm
￿xed-e⁄ects speci￿cation controls for unobserved sources of ￿rm heterogeneity and solves
problems in which an unobserved time-invariant variable simultaneously determines both
the lender choice and the bank equity stake in the borrower ￿rm.
A ￿nal approach we use to address endogeneity concerns is instrumental variable esti-
mation methods, where the ￿rst stage models the bank equity stake using as instrument a
variable that indicated whether the ￿rm is publicly listed or private. Banks are more likely to
have equity stakes in publicly listed ￿rms as these stakes bene￿t from liquidity. We conclude
that results are robust to all this endogeneity bias correction.
Other authors have studied prior lending activity and its e⁄ect on the probability that
banks extend loans and win underwriting mandates (Yasuda (2005), Bharath et al. (2007),
5and Drucker and Puri (2005)). The e⁄ect of prior lending activity on borrowing costs is also
mixed. Bharath et al. (2008) ￿nd repeated borrowing from the send lender is associated
with lower interest rate spreads. In contrast, Schenone (2009) ￿nds evidence that lending
relationships can help banks earn information rents in the form of higher interest rate spreads
when ￿rms face high switching costs (i.e., before going public).
Our research contributes to the literature on relationship banking by using insider stakes
to capture how dependent the ￿rm is on its lender. Other authors focus on other measures
of the intensity of bank-￿rm relationships such as the geographic distance between bank
and borrower (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Degryse and Ongena (2005)); the duration of the
relationship (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Degryse and Van Cayseele
(2000), and Ongena and Smith (2001)); and the nationality of both bank and borrower
(Carey and Nini (2007) and Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo (2007)). The evidence favors
improved credit availability, but there is mixed evidence regarding borrowing costs. Berger
and Udell (1995) ￿nd that ￿rms with longer lending relationships pay lower interest rates,
while Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) ￿nd contract terms deteriorate with the duration of
relationships in Europe.
Evidence so far on the in￿ uence of banks on corporations through equity stakes or board
seats is mixed (Drucker and Puri (2006)). In Germany, Gorton and Schmid (2000) ￿nd that
banks use their equity holdings and board seats to improve ￿rm performance, while more
recently Dittman, Maug, and Schneider (2007) ￿nd evidence that bank representation on the
boards of non-￿nancial ￿rms is not necessarily in the best interest of ￿rms. In Japan, ￿rms
with close bank ties have higher borrowing costs (Weinstein and Yafeh (1998)). They also
experience poorer pro￿tability (Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000)); adopt policies
that favor creditors over shareholders (Morck and Nakamura (1999)); and face higher bond
underwriting fees (Yasuda (2007)). In Europe, Kracaw and Zenner (1998) ￿nd a negative
stock price reaction to bank loans if a banker sits on a borrower￿ s board of directors.
In short, our ￿ndings suggest that universal banks involvement in non-￿nancial corpora-
tions as shareholders has implications in the credit market. An insider bank is likely to be
the ￿rm￿ s main lender, which may generate bene￿ts to the ￿rm in terms of credit availability
but can also hold up the ￿rm. This information monopoly could be later be exploited by
the insider bank by extracting rents from the ￿rm. This ￿nding suggests that regulators
6should be aware of the credit market implications of policies regarding the structure of the




We use an unique data set constructed from several data sources: the Securities Statistics
Integrated System, the Central Credit Register, the Central Balance-Sheet Database, the
Quadros de Pessoal and Thomson￿ s Datastream. These data sources provide the necessary
information to test our hypothesis on the Portuguese corporate sector. The data covers the
period from 2001 to 2007.
The Securities Statistics Integrated System gathers information on equity and debt secu-
rities issued by non-￿nancial ￿rms allowing to identify the non-￿nancial ￿rms on which banks
have equity stakes, as well as the market value of their positions.4 This data source also
allows us to identify if this equity stake is hold by the bank or through a mutual fund, pen-
sion fund, venture capital or insurance company belonging to the same banking group. The
analysis is restricted to the 20 largest banks operating in Portugal, when measured regarding
credit granted or equity holdings. In addition, this data source also includes information on
debt securities issued by ￿rm and owned by banks.
The Central Credit Register, managed by Banco de Portugal, collects monthly informa-
tion on loans granted to non-￿nancial corporations by all credit institutions operating in
Portugal. Information on credit lines is also reported. We use information from this data-
base to compute the number of banking relationships of each ￿rm and the market share of
banks in terms of credit granted to ￿rms.
Additional data for this work comes from the Central Balance-Sheet Database, providing
the accounting information on ￿rms, such as assets, equity, debt, interest paid and earn-
ings. The two other data sources, the Quadros de Pessoal, and Datastream, were used to
complement the database with additional variables on ￿rms. From the Quadros de Pessoal
database, which is mandatory employment survey collected yearly by the Portuguese Min-
4The Securities Statistics Integrated System does not provide information on the issuer ￿rm of about
30% of the value of banks securities holdings.
7istry of Labor and Social Security, we are able to collect information on the existence of
foreign shareholders in the company. Information on which ￿rms are publicly listed ￿rms is
obtained from Datastream.
The ￿nal sample contains all non-￿nancial ￿rms with have information on both the
Central Credit Register and the Central Balance-Sheet Database for at least four years in
the 2001-2007 period. These ￿rms are required to have annual total assets of at least ten
million euros. Notice that the sample includes not only ￿rms on which banks have equity
stakes, but also other non ￿nancial ￿rms.
We want to test if a bank is more likely to grant a loan to a ￿rm where it has an equity
stake. In order to do this analysis, we need to construct all possible pairs between banks and
borrower ￿rm. Some of these pairs are matched, that is, a bank lends to the ￿rm; some are
not matched. Hence, for each ￿rm and for each year, we expanded the database to consider
all possible combinations between each ￿rm and the largest 20 banking groups operating in
Portugal. Given that the sample period covers seven years of data, 20 banking groups and
more than 2,000 ￿rms, our test sample has more than 300,000 observations.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
This section presents descriptive statistics of our variables. Table 1 presents detailed variables
de￿nition. In order to avoid spurious inference we exclude outliers, we winsorize variables
at the bottom and top 1% level.5
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of our data. Panels A and B provide the distribution
of bank equity stakes on non-￿nancial ￿rms by year. The Bank Ownership (dummy) is a
variable that takes the value of one when the equity stake is at least 1%, and zero otherwise.
Panel A presents the number of bank equity stakes and panel B presents the number of ￿rms
with bank equity stakes. There is not much variation on the number of bank equity stakes
over time. Banks have an equity stake on about 60 ￿rms and each ￿rm has 1 or 2 banking
groups as shareholder on average. Our sample comprises a total of 874 bank equity stakes
in the 2001-2007 period, corresponding to a total of 454 ￿rm-year observations. Table 2 also
presents information on which division of the banking group holds the equity stake: bank
division or non-bank divisions (i.e., insurance companies, mutual funds, venture capital and
5(For the continuous ￿rm-bank variables, the observations above the 98th percentile are also winsorized.)
8pension funds). Equity stakes are more frequently in the bank division. The Public Debt
Ownership (dummy) is a variable that takes the value of one when the banking group owns
debt securities in non-￿nancial ￿rm and zero otherwise. There is an increase in ownership
of debt securities by banks over time in the 2001-2007 period.
Panel C presents summary statistics of the bank ownership variable when measured
as a percentage of the book value of equity. In our sample, the average equity stake per
observation is 12% of the book value of equity, while the median is 5%. On average, the
value of debt securities owned by banks, as a percentage of the book value of debt, is 13%
and the median is 8%.
Panel D presents summary statistics of loans granted by banks as a percentage of the total
loans of the ￿rm. Loans granted by banks that are simultaneously creditors and shareholders
of the ￿rm represent, on average, 40% of the total loans of the ￿rm. Taking into account
all ￿rm/bank observations when the bank does not have an equity stake, the average loan
is lower (25%), implying that the when a bank has an equity stake in the ￿rm is more likely
to give a loan to the ￿rm.
Panel E presents summary statistics of bank ownership non-￿nancial ￿rms and other
￿rm-level control variables. Bank Ownership (%) is the sum of equity stake of all banks in
each ￿rm. On average, the share of capital owned by the banks is 22%.6 The value of debt
securities (Public Debt Ownership) owned by banks is 20% on average. The number of bank
shareholders is a variable that measures the number of banking groups with equity stakes
in a ￿rm.7 This variable has a large dispersion. In fact, the number of bank shareholders
can be very high in the case of large or listed ￿rms. Panel E also presents a comparison
of summary statistics of ￿rm-level control variables between ￿rms with bank ownership and
￿rms without bank ownership. The number of banking relationships variable corresponds to
the number of banking groups granting credit to given ￿rm. We do not observe a signi￿cant
di⁄erence in the number of banking relationships between the two groups. Firms where
banks have an equity stake are, on average, slightly larger but with less tangible assets then
the other ones. Firms where banks have an equity stake are also less pro￿table, interest
6The maximum value observed is higher than 100% because this variable considers the market value of
the equity stake of banks over the book value of equity. However, values higher than one are observed for
just 1% of the observations.
7Notice that this variable can be much larger than 20, which is the number of bankings we are considering
in the sample, as it was constructed before imposing this constraint.
9coverage is lower, and the importance of foreign shareholders is smaller. Firms where banks
have an equity stake are more likely to have public debt and to be publicly listed.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Main Results
A closer relationship between the bank and the ￿rm should be associated with better in-
formation ￿ ow, allowing banks to better screen loans. A testable implication is that banks
with equity stakes in the ￿rm are more likely to capture future loans of the ￿rm. To test
this hypothesis, for each ￿rm and in each year, we create a set of 20 potential lenders, which
results in 20 ￿rm-bank pairs per year. Each pair ￿rm-bank, for each year, is the unit of
observation in our sample. We estimate a logit model and a linear regression (OLS) model:
Loani;g;t = ￿t + ￿i + #g + ￿(Bank Ownership)i;g;t￿1 (1)
+￿(Credit Relationship)i;g;t + ￿Xi;t￿1 + ￿Yg;t + "i;g;t
where Loani;g;t is: (1) a dummy variable equal to one if bank g grants credit to ￿rm i in year
t and zero otherwise in the case of the logit model; or (2) credit granted by bank g to ￿rm i
as a percentage of the total loans of the ￿rm in year t in the case of the OLS model. Bank
Ownershipi;g;t is: (1) a dummy variable equal to one if bank g has an equity stake in ￿rm
i in year t; and zero otherwise; or (2) equity stake of bank g as a percentage of the book
value of equity of ￿rm i in year t; this variable is lagged one period. Credit Relationshipi;g;t
is value of the loans that bank g granted to ￿rm i in year t; this variable is lagged one
period. Xi;t are ￿rm-level control variables, including assets (log), return on investment,
tangible assets, interest coverage, leverage, number of banking relationships, number of bank
shareholders, ￿rm with public debt outstanding dummy variable and publicly traded ￿rm
dummy variable; ￿rm-level control variables are lagged one period. Yg;t is market share of
each bank g considering only loans granted to the corporate sector in year t. ￿t is a year
￿xed e⁄ect, ￿i is a ￿rm (or industry) ￿xed e⁄ect, and #g is a bank ￿xed e⁄ect. We estimate
a speci￿cation with industry and year ￿xed e⁄ects and a speci￿cation with ￿rm, bank and
year ￿xed e⁄ects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the ￿rm level.
10Table 3 reports the estimates of equation (1). Columns (1)-(4) report the results for
the logit speci￿cation and columns (4)-(8) report the results for the OLS speci￿cation. The
coe¢ cient on the bank ownership variable is positive and statistically signi￿cant in all speci￿-
cations. The e⁄ect is also economically signi￿cant. Using the estimate of the bank ownership
(dummy) coe¢ cient in column (1), the predicted probability of a bank granting credit to a
￿rm if it does not have an equity stake in the ￿rm is 14%, while the predicted probability of
granting credit to the ￿rm if it has an equity stake is 25% (other variables evaluated at their
means). Thus, holding everything else equal, the probability of a bank granting credit to a
￿rm is increased by 10.7 percentage points if it has an equity stake in the borrowing ￿rm.
The results in Table 3 show that the ￿nding of a positive e⁄ect of bank ownership on
the choice a future lender is robust in several ways. First, we use a continuous variable for
bank ownership. Second, we use an OLS speci￿cation where the dependent variable is the
share of loans of the bank in a ￿rm. Finally, we estimate a speci￿cation with ￿rm (and
bank) ￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects results show that time-invariant unobservable ￿rm
characteristics do not seem to explain our ￿ndings.
Other explanatory variables have the predicted sign and have a signi￿cant impact on
the lender choice. The market share of the bank in the loan market has a positive and
signi￿cant coe¢ cient. The increase in probability of increasing the market share from the
5th- to the 95th-percentile is 40 percentage points using the estimates in column (1). In
addition, the existence of a past credit relationship has a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient,
which indicates that past lending relationships increase the likelihood that the bank will be
chosen for future loans by the same ￿rm.
Table 4 present results of robustness checks of the results in Table 3. We present estimates
for the logit model in equation (1) but we obtain consistent ￿ndings using the OLS model.
We ￿rst check the sensitivity of the results to consider bank equity stakes only if they are
above 5% of the book value of equity, rather than 1%. Columns (1) and (2) present the
results for this robustness test. We ￿nd that the predicted probability of a bank granting
credit to a ￿rm increases from 14% if it does not have an equity stake in the ￿rm to 28% if it
has an equity stake. We next estimate speci￿cations to take into account the division within
the banking group that has the equity stake on the ￿rm. We divide bank divisions into
two groups: banks and non-banks (mutual fund, pension fund, venture capital or insurance
11company). Non-bank divisions cannot grant loans, but can invest in the borrowing ￿rm.
Moreover, the rationale for investing in a ￿rm may be di⁄erent across the di⁄erent types of
bank divisions. Columns (3) and (4) present the results. We ￿nd that the probability of a
bank granting credit to a ￿rm is increased by 14 percentage points if it has an equity stake in
the borrowing ￿rm through the bank. Moreover, we ￿nd a similar e⁄ect if the equity stake
is owned by a non-bank division bank of the banking group. Overall, our results are robust
to alternative de￿nitions of the size and type of bank equity stake.
Table 5 present results of robustness checks that include additional control variables. We
present estimates for the logit model and OLS model in equation (1). We ￿rst control for
bank public debt ownership, i.e., if the bank granting the credit also own debt securities
issued by the ￿rm. We consider both a dummy variable and a continuous variable similar
to the bank equity ownership. We also include other ￿rm-level control variables, including
￿rm size, pro￿tability, leverage, Interest, assets tangibility, number of banking relationships,
number of ￿nancial shareholders, if the ￿rm has issued debt securities, and if it has foreign
shareholders. Our results remain robust as the coe¢ cient of the Bank Ownership variable is
positive and signi￿cant. Firm size and the number of banking relationships have a positive
and signi￿cant e⁄ect on granted loans, while interest coverage has a negative e⁄ect.
3.2 E⁄ect of Information Asymmetry
Equilibrium models of credit rationing suggest that small ￿rms could be seriously vulnerable
to credit rationing as they are often informationally opaque (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The
problem of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders tend to be more severe for
smaller ￿rms, as these ￿rms release less information, with lower frequency than larger ￿rms
and they are also less followed by analysts. Stein (2002) argues that small business lending
relies mostly on informations that cannot be veri￿ed by other than the ones producing it.
As a result, small ￿rms may not be able to invest in positive net present value projects
because potential providers of external ￿nance may not be able to readily access the quality
of projects. Hence, as banks with equity stakes may be able to collect more information on
the ￿rm, we should expect a negative association between ￿rm size and its use of the insider
bank to obtain future loan.
We test hypothesis 2 using ￿rm size as a proxy for information asymmetry. We estimate
12the logit (Panel A) and OLS (Panel B) models with ￿rm and bank ￿xed e⁄ects in equation
(1) including an interaction term of the bank ownership variable with ￿rm size. Column (1)
of Table 6 present the results. We ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on bank ownership is positive
and signi￿cant. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is negative and signi￿cant
at 1%, suggesting that the e⁄ect of an insider bank in lender choice if lower in larger ￿rms.
We conclude that smaller ￿rms relay more on insider banks to obtain future loans.
We employ alternative proxies for borrower information transparency to test this hy-
pothesis. We use the ratio of tangible assets over total assets to measure assets￿tangibility.
Firms with less tangible assets can be seen as facing more information asymmetry as assets
tend to be more di¢ cult to value. These ￿rms are expected to rely more on insider bank
￿nancing. However, we do not observe a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the interaction term in this
case (see column (2)). We also use a dummy variable for ￿rms issuing debt securities and
￿rms that are listed in a stock exchange. Firms whose securities are transacted in public
markets tend to be more transparent as they may face stronger information requirements
to the public they can be more easily followed by analysts. Moreover, ￿rms with access to
public debt markets have more ￿nancing alternatives. Results in column (3) of Table 6 show
that this interaction term is not signi￿cant.
In summary, we ￿nd the e⁄ect bank equity stakes in the choice of future lenders is more
pronounced in smaller ￿rms. This is consistent with the idea that information asymmetry
plays an important role in explaining our results as in hypothesis 2. Smaller ￿rms are also
more likely to have higher agency costs of debt. Additionally, we ￿nd that tangibility and
the possibility to issue public debt does not seem to matter signi￿cantly for the relation
between lender choice and bank equity stakes.
3.3 E⁄ect of the Strength of Relationships
In this section we test hypothesis 3 that stronger ￿rm-bank relationships have an e⁄ect
on the probability of an insider bank to grant a credit to the ￿rm. From the ￿rm￿ s point
of view, a stronger bank relationship may be considered valuable as banks may be more
willing to make unpro￿table loans to customers during di¢ cult ￿nancial times when they
trust losses will be recouped over the course of a long relationship. On the other hand,
banks may acquire private information over the course of a relationship and e⁄ectively ￿lock-
13in￿customers. Several empirical studies use the duration of a bank borrower relationship
as a measure of the strength of relationship. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and
Udell (1995) ￿nd that the duration of the bank-borrower relationship positively a⁄ects the
availability of credit. This result is consistent with the idea that the longer the duration
of the relationship, the greater the information exchange. On the other hand, Ongena and
Smith (2000) conclude that the value of a relationship declines through time and that ￿rms
are able to end relationships early, possibly to avoid lock-in. Moreover, the ability of one
bank to hold-up a ￿rm is lower for ￿rms with alternative sources of bank credit.
For our empirical tests, we use two variables to proxy for the strength of the relationship
between ￿rm and bank. We use the number of banking relationships and the number of
￿nancial shareholders of the ￿rm. We expect that a ￿rm with a higher number of lending
relationships and number of ￿nancial shareholders to have a lower likelihood to select the
insider bank as future lender. In contrast, ￿rms with a lower number of lending relationships
or ￿nancial shareholders are more likely to rely on the insider bank as they are more exposed
to adverse selection (lemons problem) if they do not use the insider bank to obtain loans.
We estimate the logit (Panel A) and OLS (Panel B) models with ￿rm and bank ￿xed
e⁄ects in equation (1) including an interaction term of the bank ownership variable with the
number of lending relationships and number of ￿nancial shareholders. The coe¢ cient of the
interaction terms are negative and signi￿cant in both cases, suggesting that the positive im-
pact of bank ownership on credit granted decreases with the number of lending relationships
and the number of ￿nancial shareholders. Firms with more lending relationships tend to be
able to obtain credit form other banks besides the insider bank, which contributes to reduce
the ability of the insider bank to hold-up the ￿rm. Insider banks of ￿rms with more ￿nancial
shareholders may have access to less information. In both cases, the e⁄ect of the insider
bank of the choice of future lenders decreases. The results are consistent with hypothesis 3.
4 Endogeneity
Endogeneity problems are ubiquitous in empirical research on corporate governance. In our
setting, there could be many reasons for bank equity stakes and lender choice to be jointly
determined. We have already addressed the potential endogeneity problems using ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ects methods that control for unobserved sources of ￿rm heterogeneity. Fixed e⁄ects
14methods solve joint determination problems in which an unobserved time-invariant variable
simultaneously determines both lender choice and bank ownership. It is also equivalent to
looking only at within-￿rm changes in bank ownership. The ￿xed e⁄ects results go a long way
toward dismissing omitted variables explanations as sources of endogeneity. Because only
the e⁄ects of within-￿rm changes in bank ownership are taken into account, ￿rm-speci￿c
omitted variables cannot explain the observed relation between lender choice and banker
ownership.
Another approach to address endogeneity concerns is to use lagged bank ownership as
an explanatory variable. We have done so in all our estimations. However, one could think
that a one-year lag is not su¢ cient to address the joint determination concern. Thus, we
estimate the logit and OLS models with ￿rm and bank ￿xed e⁄ects in equation (1) with bank
ownerships measured with a three-year lag. Table 7 present the results of these estimations,
con￿rming a positive relation between lender choice and bank ownership.
We also use two-stage least squares (2SLS) address the potential endogeneity of PIN.
Two-stage least squares methods allow us to address omitted variables and reverse causality
issues simultaneously. The caveat is that, unlike the ￿xed e⁄ects method, it requires stronger
assumptions that are usually not possible to test for. Under standard identi￿cation assump-
tions, we apply 2SLS methods to isolate the e⁄ect of bank ownership on lender choice. To
this end, we need instruments for bank ownership: a variable that is correlated with bank
ownership, but uncorrelated with lender choice except indirectly through other independent
variables. That is, the instrument should be a variable that can be excluded from the original
list of control variables without a⁄ecting the results. This last requirement cannot be tested
by statistical methods. It is, in the end, an act of faith.
We use the publicly listed dummy as an instrument. This dummy takes the value of one
if a ￿rm is publicly listed and zero if a ￿rm is private. Banks are more likely to have equity
stakes or ownership in publicly listed ￿rms as the shares of these ￿rms bene￿t from liquidity.
On the other hand, private ￿rms equity stakes cannot be traded in public stock markets.
Column (1) of Table 8 present the results of the ￿rst stage regressions that use bank
ownership (continuous variable) as the dependent variable. The results support the conclu-
sion that the publicly listed dummy coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cantly related to bank
ownership. F-test that the instrument can be excluded from the ￿rst-stage regressions is
15strongly rejected. We conclude that our instrument is associated with bank ownership and
that our speci￿cations do not su⁄er from weak instruments concerns. Column (2) present
the coe¢ cients of the second-stage regression that uses a dummy variable of lender choice as
the dependent variable. Since the variable in the second stage is a dummy variable a probit
model is used in the second stage. There is still evidence of a positive relation between bank
ownership and lender choice after taking into account the possibility that bank ownership
is endogenous. The evidence suggests the existence of a causal link from bank ownership to
lender choice in the credit market.
To assess the robustness of our conclusions from our instrumental variable tests, we em-
ploy an additional empirical strategy that involves estimating the e⁄ect of an endogenously
chosen dummy variable (bank ownership) on another endogenous variable, which is contin-
uous (credit granted by a bank to the ￿rm as a percentage of the total loans of the ￿rm).
This set-up can be estimated using the treatment e⁄ects model. We report the results from
the treatment e⁄ects model in columns (3) and 4) of Table 8. Column (3) presents the ￿rst
stage results and we can see the publicly listed dummy coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cant,
implying that banks are more likely to have equity stakes in publicly listed borrower ￿rms.
Column (4) reports the endogeneity-adjusted estimate of the existence of a bank equity stake
in the borrower on the amount credit granted to that borrower (as a percentage of the total
credit of the borrower). The coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cant. Thus, after controlling for
endogeneity, in a treatment e⁄ects model, we continue to ￿nd that banks with equity stakes
in the borrower are more likely to be chosen to provide future loans.
5 Conclusion
Our paper seeks to measure the e⁄ects that a bank corporate control over borrowers through
equity stakes has in the credit market, in particular in the choice of the lender. For lenders,
the establishment of an equity link with a borrower allows for more e¢ cient information
production and processing in o⁄ering future loans. Consequently, a lender with an equity
stake in the borrower should be more likely to secure the future business of its borrowers.
Using a sample of portuguese private and publicly listed ￿rms, we ￿nd that the existence
of an equity stake in a borrower signi￿cantly increases the likelihood of winning this bor-
rower￿ s future loan business both statistically and economically. Moreover, we ￿nd that the
16increased likelihood of winning future business is most powerful for those borrowers that
su⁄er from the greatest degree of informational asymmetry. Our ￿ndings suggest that uni-
versal banks involvement in non-￿nancial corporations as shareholders has implications in
the credit market. An insider bank is likely to be the ￿rm￿ s main lender, which may generate
bene￿ts to the ￿rm in terms of credit availability but can also hold up the ￿rm.
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20Table 1: Variables de￿nition
The equity stake is de￿ned as the market value of the participation as a percentage of the book value of equity.
Bank-￿rm variables
Loan (dummy) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the banking group grants credit to the ￿rm, and zero otherwise.
Loan (%) Variable that measures the credit granted by the banking group as a percentage of total loans of the ￿rm.
Bank Ownership (dummy) Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the equity stake is higher than one percent, and 0 otherwise.
Bank Ownership (%) Variable that measures the equity stake if higher than one percent and zero otherwise.
Bank Ownership 5 (dummy) Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the equity stake is higher than ￿ve per cent, and 0 otherwise.
Bank Ownership 5 (%) Variable that measures the equity stake if higher than ￿ve percent and zero otherwise.
Bank Ownership 5 (dummy, through ENT) Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the entity with an equity stake higher than one percent is ENT,
where ENT can be banks or non-banks. This variable is zero otherwise.
Bank Public Debt Ownership (dummy) Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the banking group owns debt securities of the ￿rm, zero otherwise.
Bank Public Debt Ownership (%) Variable that measures the value of debt securities owned by the bank group as a percentage of total debt of the ￿rm.
Credit Relationship Variable that measures the credit granted by a banking group as a percentage of the total loans of a given ￿rm
at the end of the year prior to the loan.
Firm variables
Assets Logarithm of total assets.
Return on Investment EBITDA as a percentage of total assets.
Tangible ￿xed assets Tangible ￿xed assets as a percentage of total assets.
Interest coverage EBITDA as a percentage of interest paid.
Leverage Financial debt as a percentage of total assets.
Number of lending relationships Number of banking groups granting credit or setting credit lines to a given ￿rm.
If a ￿nancial institution does not belong to a banking group it is taken as a banking group itself.
Number of ￿nancial shareholders Total number of banking groups with an equity stake on a ￿rm, where a ￿nancial institution
not belonging to a banking group was assumed as a banking group itself.
Bonds Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ￿rm has public debt and zero otherwise.
Foreign capital Variable that measures the percentage of capital owned by foreigners.
Listed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ￿rm is publicly traded and zero otherwise.
Bank variables
Bank Market Share Bank market share measured in terms of granted credit.
2
1Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: For the number of observations
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Bank Ownership (dummy) 109 122 138 126 128 132 119 874
Bank Ownership 5 (dummy) 59 64 70 63 62 61 58 437
Bank Ownership 5 (dummy, through banks) 38 36 34 29 25 23 22 207
Bank Ownership 5 (dummy, through non- banks) 23 31 41 38 42 44 42 261
Bank Public Debt Ownership (dummy) 157 136 134 146 173 308 425 1479
Panel B: For the number of participated ￿rms
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Bank Ownership (dummy) 60 68 72 67 67 65 55 454
Bank Ownership 5 (dummy) 40 43 47 41 42 38 37 288
Bank Ownership 5 (dummy, through banks) 28 26 23 23 22 17 16 155
Bank Ownership 5 (dummy, through non- banks) 17 25 32 26 29 30 27 186
Bank Public Debt Ownership (dummy) 84 76 81 97 113 198 300 949
2
2Panel C: Per observation, bank ownership and bank market share
N Mean Sd Median Min Max
Bank Ownership (%) 874 0.12 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.75
Bank Ownership 5 (%) 437 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.75
Bank Public Debt Ownership (%) 1479 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.64
Bank Market share 140 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.27
Panel D: Per observation, bank credit
Includes only firms where banks have equity stakes
N Mean Sd Median Min Max
Loan (%) (if Loan>0) 463 0.40 0.38 0.28 0 1
Loan (%) (if Loan=>0) 874 0.21 0.34 0.00 0 1
Includes only firms where banks do not have equity stakes
N Mean Sd Median Min Max
Loan (%) (if Loan>0) 48570 0.25 0.29 0.13 0 1
Loan (%) (if Loan=>0) 286808 0.04 0.15 0.00 0 1
Panel E: Per ￿rm
Includes only firms where banks have equity stakes
N Mean Sd Median Min Max
Bank Ownership (%) 454 0.22 0.28 0.12 0.01 2.01
Bank Ownership 5 (%) 288 0.32 0.29 0.20 0.05 1.93
Bank Public Debt Ownership (%) 949 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.01 1.85
Number of financial shareholders 454 11.72 16.34 5.00 1 101
Includes only firms where banks have equity stakes
N Mean Sd Median Min Max
Log of assets 435 18.21 1.85 18.40 13.50 21.07
Return on Investment 435 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.09 0.37
Tangible fixed assets 435 0.22 0.27 0.10 0.00 0.95
Interest coverage 434 3.59 18.62 0.82 -59.24 245.41
Leverage 435 0.30 0.22 0.31 0.00 0.91
Number of lending relationships 454 5.03 3.64 4 0 19
Bonds 435 0.39 0.49 0 0 1
Foreign capital 340 11.31 24.63 0 0 100
Listed 454 0.41 0.49 0 0 1
Includes only firms where banks do not have equity stakes
N Mean Sd Median Min Max
Log of assets 13022 17.42 1.04 17.19 13.95 21.07
Return on Investment 13022 0.08 0.09 0.07 -0.09 0.38
Tangible fixed assets 13022 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.00 0.95
Interest coverage 12996 13.27 49.27 2.96 -59.24 393.63
Leverage 13022 0.30 0.23 0.28 0.00 0.91
Number of lending relationships 13991 4.45 2.86 4 0 22
Bonds 13022 0.10 0.30 0 0 1
Foreign capital 10448 20.11 38.36 0 0 100
Listed 13991 0.01 0.11 0 0 1
23Table 3: E⁄ect of bank equity stake on lending





















































Industry dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Model Logit Cond Logit Logit Cond Logit OLS OLS OLS OLS






Number of obs 268887 264349 266667 264349 268887 268887 268887 268887
In columns 1 to 4, the dependent variable takes a value of one if the banking group grants credit to the ￿rm in a given year and zero otherwise.
In columns 4 to 8, the dependent variable is the weight of the credit granted by a banking group to a ￿rm in a given year on the total credit
of the ￿rm in the same year. Bank Ownership (dummy) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when there is a equity stake and zero
otherwise. Bank Ownership (%) is the equity stake as a percentage of book value of equity. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ￿rm clustering are
in parenthesis. ￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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4Table 4: Robustness: Size and Types of Equity Stakes of 5 %
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)

































Industry dummies Yes No Yes No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies No Yes No Yes
Firm dummies No Yes No Yes
Model Logit Cond Logit Logit Cond Logit




semi-elasticity (Bank ownership - through banks)
0:141￿￿
(1:97)
semi-elasticity (Bank ownership - through non banks)
0:142￿
(1:94)
Number of obs 268887 264349 268887 264349
The dependent variable takes a value of one if the banking group grants credit to the ￿rm in a given year
and zero otherwise. Bank Ownership 5 (dummy) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the
equity stake is higher than 5% and zero otherwise. Bank Ownership 5 (dummy, through banks) and Bank
Ownership 5 (dummy, through non-banks) are de￿ned as before but for taking into account the diviosion of
the baking group holding the equity stake. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ￿rm clustering are in parenthesis.
￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
25Table 5: Robustness tests, control for other variables
























































































































Industry dummies No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Cond Logit Cond Logit OLS OLS
Pseudo R2 0:509 0:509 0:589 0:589
Number of obs 193292 193292 196355 196355
In models (1) and (2) the dependent variable takes a value of one if the banking group grants credit to
the ￿rm in a given year and zero otherwise. In models (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the weight
of the credit granted by a banking group to a ￿rm in a given year on the total credit of the ￿rm in the
same year. Bank Ownership (dummy) is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is a equity stake
and 0 otherwise. Bank Ownership (%) is the equity stake as a percentage of book value of equity. Bank
Public Debt Ownership (dummy) is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the banking group owns
debt securities of the ￿rm. Bank Public Debt Ownership (%) measures the value of debt securities owned
by the bank as a percentage of total debt of the ￿rm. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ￿rm clustering are in
parenthesis. ￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
26Table 6: Information asymmetry and strenght of relationships
Panel A: Logit model
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Assets Tangible Bonds Number of lending Number of ￿nancial
























































Industry dummies No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Cond Logit Cond Logit Cond Logit Cond Logit Cond Logit
pseudo R2 0:502 0:501 0:501 0:505 0:501
Number of obs 264349 264349 264349 264349 264349
The dependent variable takes a value of one if the banking group grants credit to the ￿rm in a given year and zero otherwise. Bank Ownership
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is an equity stake and 0 otherwise. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ￿rm clustering are in
parenthesis. ￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
2
7Panel B: Linear regressions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Assets Tangible Bonds Number of lending Number of ￿nancial
























































Industry dummies No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0:592 0:592 0:592 0:592 0:592
Number of obs 268887 268887 268887 268887 268887
The dependent variable is the weight of the credit granted by a banking group to a ￿rm in a given year on the total credit of the ￿rm in the
same year. Bank Ownership is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is an equity stake and 0 otherwise. Robust t-statistics adjusted
for ￿rm clustering are in parenthesis. ￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
2
8Table 7: Robustness tests - bank ownership variable lagged three periods





























Industry dummies Yes Yes No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank dummies No No Yes Yes
Firm dummies No No Yes Yes
Model Logit Logit OLS OLS
Pseudo R2 0:36 0:36 0:576 0:576
Number of obs 179284 179284 179284 179284
In models (1) and (2) the dependent variable takes a value of one if the banking group grants credit to
the ￿rm in a given year and zero otherwise. In models (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the weight
of the credit granted by a banking group to a ￿rm in a given year on the total credit of the ￿rm in the
same year. Bank Ownership (dummy) is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is a equity stake
and 0 otherwise. Bank Ownership (%) is the equity stake as a percentage of book value of equity. Robust
t-statistics adjusted for ￿rm clustering are in parenthesis. ￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
29Table 8: Instrumental Variables Regression Estimation
Variables Instrumental Variables Probit Treatment E⁄ects Model
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage


























Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 268887 268887 268887 268887
This table provides the results of a instrumental variables (IV) estimation with Listed as an instrument for
Bank Ownership. The Instrumental Variables Probit consists of an OLS estimation in the ￿rst stage and
probit in the second stage; the Treatment E⁄ects Model consists on a logit estimation in the ￿rst stage and
OLS in the second stage. In the Treatment E⁄ects Model, robust t-statistics adjusted for ￿rm clustering in
parenthesis. ￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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